A startling black-and-white photo appears in the entrance to Freud’s home in London. Taken on May 3, 1925, it shows Amalia Freud, age 89, locked arm-in-arm with her son, age 68. Two years earlier, Sigmund Freud had undergone the first of a series of operations to excise the cancerous growth in his mouth. On May 6, Freud, whose surgical wounds are visible on the right side of his face, would be celebrating his 69th birthday.

At the time this photo was taken, Freud had been arguing for months with Otto Rank over the meaning of *The Trauma of Birth* for psychoanalytic theory and therapy. *Trauma* means “wound” in Greek. During 1924 the Secret Committee had exploded in bitter recriminations, with accusations of “anti-Oedipal” heresy hurled at Rank by Jones and Abraham. Rank’s “trauma” focused on the child’s ambivalence at separating from its powerful mother rather than fear of its castrating father. It followed from Rank’s heresy, Jones (1957) observes with alarm, “that all mental conflicts concerned the relation of the child to its mother, and that what might appear to be conflicts with the father, including the Oedipus complex, were but a
mask for the essential ones” (p. 58). Inexplicably, Rank was abandoning Freud’s most important theory, the principal outcome of his self-analysis. Because of Rank’s focus in The Trauma of Birth on fear of the powerful mother rather than fear of the father, Freud had turned sharply against Rank, whom everyone on the Committee knew he had only recently anointed as “my heir” (Lieberman and Kramer, 2012, p. 225).

In 1923, when Rank penned Trauma, he was at the peak of his influence, recognized throughout the tiny psychoanalytic world as vice-president of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, director of the Verlag, and coeditor of Imago and Zeitschrift, the two leading analytic journals. Havelock Ellis (1923) called him “perhaps the most brilliant and clairvoyant of the young investigators who still stand by the master’s side” (p. 111). Next to Freud, Rank was the most senior training analyst, “the one-man training institute of Vienna,” remembers Franz Alexander (Lieberman 1979, p. 13). His position was undisputed. Summing up Rank’s vital role, Hanns Sachs described him, simply, as Freud’s Doppelgänger: “Lord Everything Else” (Sachs 1944, p. 60).


Poignantly, Freud himself does not show much of a “happy countenance” in this May 3, 1925 photo. According to psychoanalysis, human beings are unable to keep secrets from anyone who has eyes to see. The unconscious is written on the body and the face. Examined closely, the expression on Freud’s face can only be described as shrecklich. His lips are parted, his eyes two pools of pain. His right arm hangs limply, as if it does not want be there, at his
mother’s side. There is probably no other photograph of Freud that reveals so much of his unconscious. It is no exaggeration, I think, to describe Freud’s unhappy countenance as the look of a small boy, chained in love and hate to his mother. The expression on Amalia’s face, although somewhat blurred, is one of enormous narcissistic pride. Undoubtedly, this is a picture of a commanding mother, a woman with an iron will, a woman who does not intend ever to be separated from her son. But to what extent, one wonders, does Freud wish to break his mother’s arm lock?

“A most thoroughgoing self-scrutiny”

During the late 1890s, Freud had struggled to reach the neurotic harbor of his own Oedipus complex, according to Peter Gay (1988), by “subjecting himself to a most thoroughgoing self-scrutiny, an elaborate, penetrating, and unceasing census of his fragmentary memories, his concealed wishes and emotions” (p. 97). Can there be any doubt that the principal “object” at the center of Freud’s self-analysis, which he continued every night for the rest of his life, was his mother?

Who was Amalia Freud? Even today, after an avalanche of books and articles on every aspect of Freud’s work and life, almost nothing is known about her except for a few scattered reminiscences. “She was charming and smiling when strangers were about, but I,” writes Judith Bernays Heller, the maternal granddaughter of Amalia, “at least always felt that with familiares she was a tyrant, and a selfish one. Quite definitely, she had a strong personality and knew what she wanted” (Heller 1973, p. 338). “I really feared” her, says Heller (ibid., p. 335). A “fine-looking” but exceptionally vain woman, Amalia “had a volatile temperament” and was “somewhat shrill and domineering”—the emotional opposite of Sigmund’s father, Jacob, who “remained quiet and imperturbable, not indifferent, but not disturbed, never out
of temper and never raising his voice” (ibid., p. 336). Even into his seventies, “Professor Freud would always find time [on] a Sunday morning to pay his mother a visit and give her the pleasure of petting and making a fuss over him” (ibid., p. 339). What made Freud, who proclaimed the universality of the Oedipus complex, regress to childhood in the presence of his mother?

For two decades a favorite son of Freud’s, Otto Rank knew everyone in Freud’s family. Like others in the inner circle, he paid courtesy calls on Freud’s mother. Might Rank’s long-standing acquaintance with Amalia’s iron will, which was visible to all who knew her, explain why he once said, bitterly, that “he couldn’t credit Freud with any more insight than a small boy” (Jones 1957, p. 172)? What does it mean for a 69-year old man to regress so visibly in the presence of his powerful mother to the emotional level of a small boy? “There is no evidence,” concedes Peter Gay (1988), “that Freud’s systematic self-scrutiny touched on this weightiest of attachments, or that he ever explored, and tried to exorcise, his mother’s power over him” (p. 505).

Why, exactly, did Freud object to The Trauma of Birth? Rank surely knew. From beginning to end, Freud idealized the mother-son relationship. He declared it “altogether the most perfect, the most free of ambivalence of all human relationships” (S.E., 22:133). While refusing to see the will of the powerful mother in the case of the little boy, Freud never idealized the mother-daughter relationship, which he saw as ambivalent from the start.

Silhouetted against the awesome paternal “object,” the mothers of Little Hans, the Rat Man and the Wolf Man are passive, disembodied, and colorless. They are never willing

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1 In New Introductory Lectures (1933). In a footnote to this sentence, James Strachey reports equivalent statements by Freud idealizing the mother-son relationship in Introductory Lectures (1916-17), Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930).
agents. They are powerless. Without doubt, Rank’s devastating observation that Freud had no more insight than “a small boy” can only be interpreted as an indictment of Freud’s self-analysis. Rank is clearly suggesting that Freud was trapped for a lifetime in the pre-Oedipal phase, like a bone stuck in the craw of his maturity, and would never reach the neurotic harbor of his own Oedipus complex.

“Primal ambivalence”

On May 6, 1923, Rank had delivered a draft of The Trauma of Birth to Freud as a gift for his 67th birthday. Sexual desire in the Oedipal phase and its related castration fear, argues Rank, is not the primal cause of emotional pain. Rather, the deepest level of angst is pre-Oedipal, linked to the font and origin of life, mother—who, from the beginning of the infant’s life is a figure of ambivalence, both worshipped and feared, loved and hated. Love and fear of the father come later, Rank insists, demoting the Oedipus complex to a secondary but still vital place in the child’s psyche.

Thrust out of the womb, the newborn unconsciously retains a feeling of “primal ambivalence” (Rank, 1924, p. 199; italics in the original) toward the “lost primal object, the mother” (ibid., p. 205), a powerful figure from the start of life. Ambivalence is strong and inevitable. Mother is loving and generous, but also inhibiting and beyond the infant’s control, hence anxiety-provoking, “a dark threatening power, capable of deepest sympathy but also greatest severity” (ibid., p. 115). For Rank, the idea of motherhood is tied to the idea of power and the exercise of authority over the child. Object-relations, asserts Rank, begin at birth, not in the Oedipal phase. Mother, not father, is the first “object” to say “No” to the infant.

But to Freud only the omnipotent father can symbolize the force of will and its psychic correlates: anxiety and guilt. Freud divined little trace of will in the psyche of women, whose
feelings mystified him. “Was will das Weib” (What does a woman want?), he asked Marie
Bonaparte in December 1925 (Jones, 1955, p. 468), when he was in the throes of his conflict
with Rank. Nowhere in his writings, for example, does Freud consider mother to be a bar, or
prohibition, against the incestuous desires of the little boy. Mother does not say “No” to the
little boy. It was inconceivable to Freud that mother was more feared than father, who is
source of the first internalized object, the super-ego, as Freud reminded the Secret Committee
in January 1924:

   The incest prohibition—where does that come from? Its representative is apparently the
   father, reality, authority—which does not permit incest… Here Rank deviates from me…
   Basically, the orientation toward the mother’s body or genitals should be an ambivalent
   one from the outset. Here lies the contradiction… [I]n analysis one will come up against
   the father again and again as the bearer of the prohibition. (Wittenberger, 1995, p. 288)

   In July 1924, Freud sent a harsh letter to Rank, then in New York on a successful lec-
   ture tour: “The elimination of the father in your theory strikes me as revealing too much the
   influence of personal factors in your life—factors I believe I am familiar with. This increases
   my suspicion that you wouldn’t have written this book if you’d undergone analysis yourself”

   Deeply wounded by Freud’s personal attack, Rank responded in August 1924, defend-
   ing his theory as “a portion of truth and reality that one cannot banish from the world by
   closing one’s eyes…. I have the definite impression that you don’t wish to see certain things or
   that you can’t see them … Now again you’re saying that I eliminated the father. That’s not so,
   of course, and cannot be: it would be nonsense. I’ve only attempted to assign him the correct
   place” (ibid., p. 209). In September 1924, Rank repeated his charge of Freud’s almost willful
   blindness toward the pre-Oedipal mother: “I have the impression that you don’t want to be
   convinced, and from your standpoint, I can understand that very well” (ibid., p. 218). The

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two tried to reconcile at the end of 1924 and met regularly during early 1925 to discuss their differences, but Freud refused to accept Rank’s pre-Oedipal theory. By mid-1925, the relationship was shattered. It could not be mended.

“I am boiling with rage”

In August 1925, Freud began work on a new manuscript with the title, *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*. “I am boiling with rage,” Freud erupted to Ferenczi (Freud & Ferenczi, 2000, p. 178). His mood while drafting the manuscript, he revealed to Ferenczi, was “absolutism moderated by treacherous assassination” (*ibid.*, p. 222). Freud virtually directed Ferenczi to choose between himself and his best friend Rank, whom Freud now intended to finish off — “assassinate” — once and for all. Freud was ready to kill Rank. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find anywhere else in Freud’s letters a reaction as murderous as this. Neither Adler nor Jung merited such a volcanic response by Freud.  

Published in March 1926, *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (S.E: 20) was Freud’s answer to *The Trauma of Birth*. Freud reverses his original belief that anxiety derives from repressed sexuality. He declares, instead, that anxiety precedes and leads to repression of sexuality. “Rank’s contention—which was originally my own—that the affect of anxiety is a consequence of the event of birth and a repetition of the situation then experienced, obliged me to review the problem of anxiety once more” (S.E., 20:161).

But Freud rejects Rank’s emphasis on the child’s emotional pain at physical birth and ambivalence toward psychological separation from mother. Birth, “is not experienced subjectively as a separation from the mother, since the foetus, being a completely narcissistic

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2 Near the end of his life, Ferenczi came to agree with Rank about Freud’s pre-Oedipal blindness. On October 2, 1932, Freud wrote to Ferenczi: “I also know from [A.A. Brill] that you don’t credit me with more insight than a little boy. (Just as Rank did back then)” (Freud and Ferenczi, 2000, p. 444).
creature, is totally unaware of her existence as an object” (S.E., 20:130). The first internalized object in the infant’s psyche is the super-ego, heir to the Oedipus complex. Thus, in 1918, Freud conceived the Wolf-Man’s father as “his first and most primitive object-choice, which, in conformity with a small child’s narcissism, had taken place along the path of identification” (S.E., 17: 27).

For Freud, the emotional experience of loss and separation anxiety is a derivative of fear of paternal castration, not connected to the child’s love and fear of its powerful mother, as Rank had argued in The Trauma of Birth. “At birth no object existed,” declares Freud, “and so no object could be missed” (S.E., 20:170). On the one hand, Freud recognizes Rank’s “discovery of [the] extensive concatenation” between birth and physiological anxiety as of “undoubted merit” (S.E., 20:151); on the other, he denies the traumatic emotional consequences of loss of, and separation at birth from, mother: “it becomes impossible to shut one’s eyes any longer to the far-fetched character of [Rank’s] explanations” (S.E., 20:136). As to the origin of emotional suffering, concedes Freud, “we are as much in the dark about this problem as we were at the start” (S.E., 20:149). In a 1926 lecture in New York, Rank answered Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety:

Freud rightly emphasizes the fact that we know too little about the newly born and its sensations to be able to draw hard-and-fast conclusions about it. But in spite of isolated observations of children and even child analyses, the same thing is true for the child in general, in whom hitherto too much of the adult, especially adult sexuality, has probably been projected. Freud’s warning … holds also for his own assertion that the mother does not represent an object for the newly born … For it is certain that the newborn child loses something as soon as it is born, indeed as soon as birth begins … One might perhaps say that in parturition the ego finds its object and then loses it again, which possibly explains many peculiarities of our psychical life.  

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In April 1926, Rank visited Berggasse 19 for the last time. “Rank seems to be retracting nothing,” Freud complained to Max Eitingon the next day. “Our conversation about my last book on anxiety revealed irreconcilable differences…. Furthermore, he indicated that he has come much further in his insights” (Freud and Eitingon, 2004, p. 452).

“The ‘bad mother’ he has never seen”

From 1926 through 1934, Otto Rank lived and worked in Paris. He made trans-Atlantic voyages every year or two to keep up his practice and teach in the United States. In late 1926, he delivered a series of lectures in New York (in English) from his forthcoming book, Vol. I of Grundzüge einer genetischen Psychologie, planned as a three-volume work.4 Rank begins, “This book is a direct continuation, development, and extension of my new orientation in psychoanalytic theory and therapy…However disconcerting it is that the founder of psychoanalysis—from whom my concept matured—has taken such an emotionally bitter attitude toward [The Trauma of Birth], I am neither disillusioned nor confused in continuing my subsequent work.” Returning to one of his central themes in The Trauma of Birth: “I have now again... come up against the [maternal] object and the object relationship, which presupposes anxiety just as much as libido”—fear just as much as love (Rank, 1927, p. iii-iv). There is no lack of ambivalence in the mother-child relationship, even for the small boy.

Rank criticizes Freud’s unwillingness to go “behind” the Oedipus situation to the ambivalent “primal object relationship” of the child, male or female, with its powerful (or “bad”) mother:

4 Vol. II of Genetische Psychologie was published in 1928; a number of chapters appear in English in Rank, 1996. Vol. III of Genetische Psychologie (1929) was translated by Jessie Taft and published in English in 1936 as Truth and Reality: A Life History of the Human Will.
[Freud] sees in the mother merely the coveted sex object, for the possession of which the child battles with the father. The “bad mother” he has never seen, but only the later displacement of her to the father, who therefore plays such an omnipotent part in his theory. The image of the bad mother, however, is present in Freud’s estimation of woman, who is merely a passive and inferior object for him: in other words, “castrated.” When he recently deprived woman even of a super-ego, which embraces the higher ethical and social abilities, he quite overlooked the enormous share the mother and the child’s relation to her have on the development of the ego and its higher capabilities.  

In a chapter entitled “The Genesis of the Object Relationship,” Rank observes, hinting at the failure of Freud’s lifelong self-analysis, that the small boy “must, so to speak, make his father bad, in order to keep his picture of the good mother clear” (Rank, 1927, pp. 113-114).

Vol. I of Genetische Psychologie offers a theory of the genesis and development of object-relationships—the ego and its relation to the superego—presaging major themes of the next half-century that were not associated with Rank because his name, by the late 1920s, had become anathema for certified psychoanalysts.

Enraged by Rank’s “anti-Oedipal” theorizing, Freud told Max Eitingon: “Rank’s Genetische Psychologie I shows him in full mania, confused, incomprehensible, impudently aggressive” (Freud and Eitingon, 2004, p. 518). To Ruth Brunswick, he spit fire: “Rank’s

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5 See Freud’s 1925 essay, “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes”: “[Women’s] super-ego is never so inexorable, so independent of its emotional origins as we require in men” (S.E., 19:257).

6 Rank, 1996, pp. 101-2. In “Literary Autobiography,” Rank (1930) observes that the analyst Charles Odier, in 1926, “quotes me in a confirmatory way with regard to the primal source of the super-ego in the pre-Oedipal (maternal) inhibitions. The pre-Oedipal super-ego has since been overemphasized by Melanie Klein without any reference to me” (p. 37). Louis Breger (2000) notes: “What is significant about Rank’s theory is that he ties the good and bad images to actual experiences of pleasure and pain associated with the mother-infant relationship, rather than to innate drives, as Melanie Klein was to do later” (p. 434).

7 In 1929, Freud wrote to Dr. Frankwood Williams, an analysand of Rank: “[Rank] has ceased to be an analyst. If you have not undergone a thorough transformation since then, I would have to dispute also your right to this name” (Gay, 1988, p. 484). Organizational politics took over. Once the #2 person in the movement, Rank was now persona non grata. In 1930, Rank’s honorary membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association was rescinded on a motion by A.A. Brill, seconded by Harry Stack Sullivan. Rank’s analysands, including Williams, had to be reanalyzed by a certified Freudian or drop out of the APA (Lieberman, 1985, p. 293).
Genetische Psychologie I is as impertinent as it is false. He has apparently isolated himself from us with giant steps” (Freud Copyrights).

“Solving the mother fixation”

In May 1926, Rank published the first of a planned three volume work, Technik der Psychoanalyse (“Technique of Psychoanalysis”).  Volume I of Technik is sub-titled The Analytic Situation. “I have now for several years attempted systematically to trace back the analysis of the transference to the time before the development of the Oedipus complex,” begins Rank (1926), “and to use the experience of the pre-Oedipus situation in the analytic transference relationship as a therapeutic agent” (pp. 3-4).

According to Freud, Rank denied all that derives from the father writ large: the super-ego, religion, law, society.  In Vol. I of Technik, Rank answers, “I endeavor only to systematize the cause and, thereby, put things in their right place, as, for example, the importance of the father—which I value by no means slightly, but only in another way” (ibid., p. 14).  Rank regards love as the most important healing factor in psychotherapy. In the opening phase of therapy, “We give the patient the mother love sought for since his earliest childhood” (ibid., p. 39).

While necessary, love is not sufficient.  “Mother love” may become an opiate, leading the patient to feel irrationally guilty for hurting the therapist by abandoning him in the end phase of therapy. Too-much love suffocates the patient’s fragile will to break out of the womb of analysis. If the first-person feeling of being in therapy is, at times, like the feeling of

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8 Vol. I of Technik was never published in English. Jessie Taft translated Vols. II and III of Technik (published in German in 1929 and 1931, respectively) as Will Therapy: An analysis of the therapeutic process in terms of relationship (1936). With Rank’s agreement, she composed the sub-title to differentiate his two-person technique from Freud’s one-person intra-psychic psychology. The terms will therapy and relationship therapy were synonymous for Rank. Willing is always relational, according to Rank.
being in the womb, where all needs are met effortlessly, then ending may be likened, symbolically, to the trauma of being “re-born.”

As Rank (1924) had already written in *The Trauma of Birth*: “For this severance from the analyst, which is the essential part of the analytic work, is accomplished by reproduction of the birth trauma, so that the patient loses his doctor and his suffering at the same time or, better expressed, must give up his doctor in order to lose his suffering” (p. 207; italics in the original). Birth is a triumph as well as a trauma.

“But the presupposition for that final aim,” observes Rank (1926) in Vol. I of *Technik*, echoing his argument two years earlier in *Trauma*, “is solving the mother fixation. For the patient is compelled to reproduce in the analytic transference the primal mother-relation: namely, the union and the separation” (p. 23). Feeling a mixture of dread and hope, the patient wants, at once, to hold on and let go, to stay connected and leave. Transference is a projection of the patient’s fragile ego onto the therapist, who is then worshipped as an “all-forgiving” deity. However, the narcissism of the analyst, whose feelings would be hurt if he were abandoned, increases the patient’s guilt-feeling. Frightened to leave, worried and guilty about hurting the feelings of the analyst, the patient may choose to sacrifice his will for independence rather than separate. During the end phase, therefore, the analyst, with the superior skill of a midwife, artfully “leads the patient to his own ego” (*ibid.*, p. 6).

The analyst plays the role of skilled midwife for the birth of individuality and self-leadership. The final “aim” of therapy: learning how to lead one’s own self and, in the process, learning how to accept full responsibility for one’s own will rather than projecting it onto others.

“Where Freud met the will of the other, he called it ‘resistance’ (to his will) ....”
In 1929 and 1931 Rank published Vols. II and III of *Technik der Psychoanalyse*. These two books were translated by Jessie Taft as *Will Therapy: An Analysis of the Therapeutic Process in Terms of Relationship*. Rank begins, “[T]he only means of healing which psychotherapy has learned to use is itself a human being, the therapist, whose own psychology also must have a decided influence upon the treatment and its outcome” (1929-31, p. 1) The analyst’s will influences the patient and vice-versa. There are two hearts and two minds, plus a host of internal “objects,” entangled in every analysis. Two wills encounter, test, resist, trust, hate, love, heal and transform each other.

"My technique puts the patient himself as chief actor in the center of the situation set up by the analyst" (*ibid*. p. 6). Of Freud’s technical papers, which recommend *Indifferenz*, Rank suggests: “Apparently the narcissism of the analyst has compensated for his passivity, so that he has related all reactions of the patient, as far as they do not permit of being put back on an infantile pattern, to his own person” (*ibid*.). Being indifferent or “neutral” toward the patient’s suffering is re-traumatizing.  

The aim of therapy, rather than to remember the traumatic past, is to help patients “learn to will” (*ibid.*, p. 9) in the present. “The feeling of *Erlebnis* purposefully and with intent, is made the central factor in the therapeutic task, not merely endured as the troublesome, if unavoidable, phenomenon of resistance” (*ibid.*, p. 5). This slowly emerging experience is the

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9 In 1936, as an outcome of a personal encounter, Rank inspired Carl Rogers to abandon the Freudian technique Rogers had been taught in his doctoral program. The “whole psychoanalytic approach is centered around the therapist,” Rank said in 1935, shortly before meeting Rogers. “*Real therapy has to be centered around the client, his difficulties, his needs, his activities*” (Rank, 1996, p. 262, italics in the original). Here we see clearly the origins of what Rogers would soon develop into client-centered therapy. “I became infected with Rankian ideas,” said Rogers (Kramer, 1995, p. 55).

10 The word *Indifferenz*, although translated by James Strachey as "neutrality" in the three places in which it appears in the *Standard Edition*, has a more callous connotation than "neutrality." According to Ernst Falzeder, “if Freud had meant ‘neutrality’ in the benevolent or non-intrusive sense, he would have used the perfectly adequate German word *Neutralität*” (personal communication).
felt sense of willing—i.e., “a learning to feel, a process in which the individual learns to develop emotions” (*ibid.*, p.165).

Following Nietzsche, who maintained the equivalence of willing and feeling, Rank (1929-31) employs the terms “will” and “counter-will” to capture the emotional give-and-take of the intersubjective relationship—“an actual feeling experience”—between patient and analyst. (*ibid.*, p. 37)

“Where Freud met the will of the other, he called it ‘resistance’ (to his will) …. “…” (Rank, 1929-31, p. 8). Rank turns resistance, or counter-willing, into a creative factor: the “negative reaction of the patient represents the actual therapeutic value, the expression of will as such” (*ibid.*, p. 13). Vital to the differentiation of self from non-self, resistance is “proof, however negative, of the strength of will on which therapeutic success ultimately depends” (*ibid.*, p. 6).

In the patient’s “present experience we have … his whole reaction pattern, all his earlier ways of reacting plus the present” (*ibid.*, p. 37). All emotional life is grounded in the present: “The neurotic lives too much in the past [and] to that extent he actually does not live. He suffers … because he clings to [the past], wants to cling to it, in order to protect himself from [painful] experience, the emotional surrender to the present” (*ibid.*, p. 27). Separating, no matter how anxiety-provoking, from outworn phases of life, including internalized others, is required for self-willing. Letting go of the past, or stepping outside one’s own ruling ideology marks the most significant and painful experience of transformation in the here-and-now: “This, then, is the New, which the patient has never experienced before” (*ibid.*, p. 65). By

11 “But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to *castrate* the intellect?” (Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, 1887, p. 119; italics in the original). Willing, for Rank as for Nietzsche, is an expression of the intelligence of the feelings. Rational decision-making is impossible without the perspective and judgment provided by feelings. Unwilling to “*castrate* the intellect,” Nietzsche infuses feelings into all of his thinking, reflecting a conviction that feelings are non-rational but intelligent, not irrational. For Nietzsche, the feelings contain a high degree of intelligence. Strong feelings are constitutive of “the will to power” or its correlative, “the will to life” (*ibid.*, p. 79).
cutting the chains to the past, the patient is more free to discover his own will.


______ 1930a. Untitled manuscript of self-analysis of writings, May 1930. Rank Collection, Rare Book and Manuscript Collection, Butler Library, Columbia University.


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